Commentary: Exploiting Mixed Speech by Corbin, Caroline Mala
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles Faculty and Deans
2015
Commentary: Exploiting Mixed Speech
Caroline Mala Corbin
University of Miami School of Law, ccorbin@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Caroline Mala Corbin, Commentary: Exploiting Mixed Speech, 6 Cal. L. Rev. Circuit 37 (2015).
	  
37 
California Law Review Circuit 
Vol.	  6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  May	  2015	  
Copyright © 2015 by California Law Review, Inc. 
Commentary: Exploiting Mixed Speech 
Caroline Mala Corbin* 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court has been taking advantage of mixed 
speech—that is, speech that is both private and governmental—to 
characterize challenged speech in a way that ultimately permits the 
government to sponsor Christian speech. In Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, a free speech case where the government accepted a 
Christian Ten Commandments monument but rejected a Summum 
Seven Aphorisms monument, the Court held that privately donated 
monuments displayed in public parks were government speech as 
opposed to private speech and therefore not subject to free speech 
limits on viewpoint discrimination. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, 
an establishment case where the local government invited 
overwhelmingly Christian clergy to give a prayer before town 
meetings, the Court found no Establishment Clause violation in part 
by attributing constitutionally troubling aspects of the speech to the 
private speakers rather than to the government. 
INTRODUCTION 
Currently, speech tends to be classified as either private speech or 
government speech, and this classification can be dispositive. If a private 
person is speaking, say with a bumper sticker, then the Free Speech Clause 
protections—such as those against viewpoint discrimination—apply but 
Establishment Clause limits on religious speech do not. If the government is 
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speaking, as with a government press release, the reverse is true: free speech 
restrictions on viewpoint discrimination do not apply but Establishment Clause 
restrictions on religious speech do. 
Despite this doctrinal dichotomy, a great deal of speech is actually neither 
purely private, nor purely governmental, but a combination of the two.1 No 
single factor necessarily determines who the speaker is. Instead, when deciding 
who is speaking, one might consider: who is the literal speaker, who 
controls the message, who pays for the speech, what is the goal of the 
program in which the speech occurs, and ultimately, to whom would a 
reasonable person attribute the speech.2 When the factors point to both 
private and government speakers, the result is mixed speech—speech that 
cannot be cleanly designated into one category or the other. 
Examples of mixed speech abound. Specialty license plates, the subject of 
a free speech case the Supreme Court will decide this term, are a classic 
example.3 On the one hand, the government authorizes, manufactures, and 
owns the specialty license plates. On the other hand, private individuals select 
them, pay extra for them, and put them on their cars. 
Recent religious speech cases, particularly Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum4 and last term’s Town of Greece v. Galloway,5 also arguably involved 
mixed speech. Pleasant Grove involved privately donated monuments 
displayed in a public park. Members of the minority Summum religion 
complained that the government violated the Free Speech Clause by favoring 
Christianity because the city had chosen to display a Ten Commandments 
monument but refused to display the group’s religious monument. In Greece, a 
municipal government invited private clergy from local congregations to give 
prayers at official town meetings. Religious minorities complained that the 
prayer program violated the Establishment Clause by favoring Christianity over 
other religions because almost all of the government-sponsored prayers were 
explicitly Christian. In both cases, the Court took advantage of the mixed 
nature of the speech at issue to characterize it in a way that permitted state 
sponsorship of Christianity. 
 
 1. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and 
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 626–40. 
 3. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2014) (No. 14-144). 
 4. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 5. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
2015] COMMENTARY: EXPLOITING MIXED SPEECH 39 
I. 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM: GOVERNMENT-SELECTED TEN 
COMMANDMENTS MONUMENT AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
Pleasant Grove was a free speech case. The city had placed eleven 
monuments donated by private individuals in its Pioneer Park. Among them 
was a Ten Commandments monument given by the Fraternal Order of Eagles 
(Eagles). The Summum, a small religious group, attempted to donate a 
religious monument listing its own tenets, the Seven Aphorisms. The city 
rejected it, explaining that it only took monuments that “directly relate” to the 
town’s history or were donated by groups “with longstanding ties” to the 
community.6 Public parks, where citizens have historically gathered to speak 
on public issues, are considered “traditional public forums.”7 Any content-
based discrimination by the state in traditional public forums is subject to strict 
scrutiny, lest the state “use content-based restrictions to advance a particular 
ideology.”8 The Summum argued that by accepting a Christian religious 
monument while rejecting their Summum religious monument, the government 
discriminated not just based on content, but on viewpoint as well. After finding 
a free speech violation, the Tenth Circuit ordered the city to erect the group’s 
monument.9 
According to the Supreme Court, the pivotal question was whether the 
government was “engaging in [its] own expressive conduct” or “providing a 
forum for private speech.”10 In other words, was the government itself speaking 
or was it merely providing an opportunity for private citizens to speak? The 
best answer may well be both. While it is difficult to pinpoint the “literal 
speaker” of a monument, the Eagles essentially signed the monument by 
carving their name on it.11 As for who controlled the message, the Eagles 
designed the monument without any input from the government,12 while the 
government decided whether to display it or not. Although there was no 
 
 6. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 465. 
 7. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (noting that streets and 
parks “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions”). 
 8. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 555 
U.S. 460 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 1057. The Court held that Pioneer Park was a traditional public forum and that 
the city’s content-based refusal failed strict scrutiny. 
 10. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 467. 
 11. “Presented to the City of Pleasant Grove and Utah County, Utah by Utah State Aerie 
Fraternal Order of Eagles” is carved on a scroll at the base of the monument. 
 12. The Pleasant Grove City Ten Commandments monolith was one of over a hundred 
that the Fraternal Order of Eagles designed, produced, and gave to local municipalities. See, e.g., 
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 2002) (“During the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Eagles donated similar [Ten Commandments] monuments to communities across the United 
States.”). 
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question that the Eagles paid for the Ten Commandments,13 there was 
disagreement about whether monuments differed from other speech in public 
parks, which had always been treated as a traditional public forum. If forced to 
choose between private and government speech, reasonable people might easily 
come to difficult conclusions, as the lower courts and the Supreme Court did. 
In the end, the Supreme Court held that monuments in public parks amounted 
to government speech: “Permanent monuments displayed on public property 
typically represent government speech.”14 
Because they were deemed government speech, the monuments were not 
subject to free speech limits on content and viewpoint discrimination. “The 
Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does 
not regulate government speech.”15 That is, under the Free Speech Clause, the 
government is free to prefer one viewpoint over another in its own speech. As 
for the obvious Establishment Clause problem created by a government 
endorsing the Ten Commandments but not the Seven Aphorisms, the question 
was not before the Court and the majority never addressed it. The Court, 
perhaps, meant to finesse the issue with its exegesis about the difficulty of 
pinpointing the meaning of symbols that may carry multiple meanings and 
whose meaning may change over time.16 While this is true, a Ten 
Commandments engraved with “I AM the LORD thy God; Thou shalt have no 
other gods before me; Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images; Thou 
shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; Remember the Sabbath 
day, to keep it holy”17 does not necessarily possess these ambiguities. 
II. 
TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY: GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PRAYERS AS 
PRIVATE SPEECH 
The Establishment Clause question was front and center in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway. The town invited local clergy––“chaplain[s] for the 
month”18––to give a prayer at the beginning of town meetings. At first, the 
town chose these unpaid chaplains by calling congregations in the town 
directory and asking for volunteers.19 Later, the town solicited chaplains from a 
list of people who had agreed to come.20 Because all the congregations listed in 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 470. 
 15. Id. at 467. 
 16. Id. at 474–77. 
 17. Summum, 297 F.3d at 997 (describing parallel Eagles Ten Commandments 
monument). 
 18. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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the directory were Christian,21 all the invited chaplains were Christian, as were 
their prayers.22 Despite the overwhelmingly Christian prayers at the very seat 
of government at the very moment of self-governance,23 the Supreme Court 
concluded that the town’s prayer program did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
Greece’s government-sponsored prayers are a paradigmatic example of 
mixed speech. The message is the result of private and government control—
the government created the prayer program and invited clergy to give prayers, 
while the clergy determined the content of the prayers. Although the literal 
speakers were private individuals, the purpose of the legislative prayers was not 
to create a forum for individual debate on prayer, but rather to use prayer for 
governmental ends: specifically to “lend gravity”24 to the town meetings and 
“to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers.”25 As with the park 
monuments, reasonable people could attribute the prayers to the government 
that sponsored them, to the private individuals who gave them, or to both. 
The Court’s exploitation of mixed speech was more subtle in Greece than 
in Summum. Unlike in Summum, where it completely avoided Free Speech 
Clause questions by defining the challenged religious speech as purely 
governmental, the Supreme Court did not completely avoid Establishment 
Clause questions by categorizing the challenged religious speech as purely 
private.26 Even the Supreme Court could not deny the strong governmental 
component of the speech. After all, the town started the prayer practice, chose 
the speakers, held the prayers at town meetings, and described the prayers as 
meant for the town’s lawmakers. Instead, the Court evaded the establishment 
problems raised by the Christian prayers by strategically emphasizing the 
private nature of the speech. This tactic is evident in both its argument that the 
predominantly Christian nature of the prayers was unintentional and 
 
 21. In fact, there was a Buddhist temple in town, but it was not listed and never contacted. 
Id. at 1828 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 22. Id. at 1816. Notably, the town never suggested that the chaplains give nonsectarian 
prayers. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1825 (“Citizens attend town meetings . . . [to] speak on matters of local 
importance; and petition the board for action that may affect their economic interests, such as the 
granting of permits, business licenses, and zoning variances.”). 
 24. Id. at 1823. 
 25. Id. at 1826. 
 26. Recall that if prayers were categorized as purely private speech, they would not trigger 
the Establishment Clause at all. 
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unavoidable,27 and its argument that the government did not coerce religious 
minorities into participating in predominantly Christian prayers.28 
Crucial to the Court’s ruling was the fact that the almost exclusively 
Christian prayers occurred without any discriminatory intent by government 
officials. Had the town purposely excluded non-Christian chaplains, the 
outcome might have been different. But here, according to the Court, it just 
happened that the local congregations were Christian: “Although most of the 
prayer-givers were Christian, this fact reflected only the predominately 
Christian identity of the town’s congregations, rather than an official policy or 
practice of discriminating against minority faiths.”29 Perhaps in order to stave 
off complaints that the Establishment Clause obliges the town to do more to 
avoid overwhelmingly Christian prayers such as recommending nonsectarian 
prayers,30 the majority suggests, but never actually holds, that requiring the 
town’s “chaplain[s] for the month” to keep their prayers nonsectarian might 
infringe on their First Amendment rights. For example, the Court states, “to 
hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures that 
sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide cases to act as 
supervisors and censors of religious speech.”31 Note the word censors. 
Censorship, of course, means that the government is silencing private speakers 
and is anathema in free speech. 
The free speech concern about government regulation of private speech 
runs throughout the opinion, even though Greece is not a free speech case, and 
the speech at issue is not purely private speech. The Court invokes free speech 
once more when it suggests––again, it does not hold but merely suggests––that 
the state has created a forum for private speech and therefore cannot 
discriminate based on content or viewpoint: “Once it invites prayer into the 
public sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own 
God or gods as conscience dictates.”32 
The Court again waves the free speech banner when grappling with 
whether citizens attending the town meeting in order to petition the government 
might feel compelled to participate in the prayers. In dismissing the notion, the 
 
 27. See Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1820–24; see also id. at 1824 (“That nearly all of the 
congregations in town turned out to be Christian does not reflect an aversion or bias on the part of 
town leaders against minority faiths. So long as the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, 
the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers 
. . . .”). 
 28. See id. at 1824–27; see also id. at 1825 (“[T]he Court is not persuaded that the town of 
Greece, through the act of offering a brief, solemn, and respectful prayer to open its monthly 
meetings, compelled its citizens to engage in a religious observance.”). 
 29. Id. at 1817 (summarizing with approval the district court’s findings). 
 30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 31. Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822; see id. (“Government may not mandate a civic religion that 
stifles any but the most generic reference to the sacred any more than it may prescribe a religious 
orthodoxy.”). 
 32. Id. 
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Court writes, “Adults often encounter speech they find disagreeable.”33 This 
deliberately echoes the famous Supreme Court passage: “‘If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.’”34 In short, the Court implies that government 
attempts at nonsectarian prayers would raise free speech problems, and that 
objectors are childish hecklers trying to censor speech they find to be 
“offensive or disagreeable” instead of accepting it as an inevitable by-product 
of our free speech regime. 
These insinuations, made possible by the mixed nature of the challenged 
speech, do not withstand closer scrutiny. To start, Greece involved no forum 
for private speech: the government selected the speakers, and the prayer 
practice was explicitly held to be for the government’s benefit.35 Indeed, how 
could the prayers amount to a forum open to private speakers when almost no 
one knew about it36 and it is unclear whether all viewpoints would be 
welcome.37 In addition, the argument that grown ups must learn to tolerate 
disagreeable speech makes more sense when the speakers are private people 
expressing their varied viewpoints as opposed to the government speaking for 
its own benefit. Granted, the speech is not purely governmental either.38 
Nonetheless, the Court’s willingness to think of it as mixed in this case stands 
in sharp contrast to its insistence in Pleasant Grove that once the speech falls 
into the government speech category, the Free Speech Clause simply does not 
apply. In other words, if the prayers represent government speech, then under 
the Supreme Court’s own government speech doctrine, the government may 
dictate the content of its own speech without worrying about the Free Speech 
Clause. 
In addition to using the mixed nature of the prayers to raise phantom free 
speech issues, the Supreme Court uses it to dissociate the government from the 
prayers. Although the Court acknowledges that certain prayers risk violating 
the Establishment Clause, it distances the town from the very qualities it 
identifies as problematic by attributing them to the private speakers. For 
example, in rejecting the coercion claim, the Court writes, “[T]he analysis 
would be different if town board members directed the public to participate in 
 
 33. Id. at 1826. 
 34. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
118 (1991) (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)). 
 35. Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (“The principal audience for these invocations is not, 
indeed, the public but lawmakers themselves, who may find that a moment of prayer or quiet 
reflection sets the mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing.”). 
 36. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the town’s “failure to infor[m] members of 
the general public that volunteers would be acceptable prayer givers” (internal citation omitted)). 
 37. While the town states they would welcome prayers other than Christian ones praising 
God and Jesus, they presumably would not welcome prayers that attacked Christian beliefs. 
 38. I argue elsewhere that regulation of mixed speech should be subject to a rigorous 
intermediate scrutiny. See Corbin, supra note 1, at 675–80. 
44 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  6:101 
prayers.”39 When confronted by the fact that on several occasions, the town’s 
chaplains of the month asked audience members to rise and join the prayer, the 
Court responds that “[t]hese requests, however, came not from the town leaders 
but from the guest ministers, who presumably are accustomed to directing their 
congregations in this way.”40 In other words, the Court determined these 
requests to join in Christian prayer came from private speakers, not from the 
government. In short, the Greece Court took advantage of the mixed nature of 
speech to dissociate the government from speech that would otherwise violate 
the Establishment Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
In both of these cases, the Supreme Court exploited the mixed nature of 
challenged speech to characterize it in a way that permits state sponsorship of 
Christian speech. In Pleasant Grove, the Court evaded the viewpoint 
discrimination issue by characterizing the speech as government speech and 
then refusing to consider the Establishment Clause issue as not before the 
Court. The bottom line was that the city could display a Christian monument 
while refusing to display a non-Christian monument. In Greece, the Court 
distanced the government from the Christian prayers the government itself 
invited by suggesting the speech was private speech, and therefore not 
attributable to the government. The Court went so far as to imply that 
regulating the religious content to be more inclusive might violate the free 
speech rights of the private religious speakers, even though no free speech 
claim was before the Court. The bottom line was that the town could continue 
opening its meetings with predominantly Christian prayers. In sum, by 
selectively emphasizing the governmental or private nature of mixed speech, 
the Supreme Court made possible state-sponsored religious speech. 
 
 39. Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826. 
 40. Id. 
